<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Environmental Crime | Bohan Chen's Personal Webpage</title><link>https://chenbh.com/tags/environmental-crime/</link><atom:link href="https://chenbh.com/tags/environmental-crime/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><description>Environmental Crime</description><generator>Hugo Blox Builder (https://hugoblox.com)</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 01 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><item><title>Modeling illegal logging in Brazil</title><link>https://chenbh.com/publication/chen-modeling-2021/</link><pubDate>Sat, 01 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://chenbh.com/publication/chen-modeling-2021/</guid><description>&lt;p>This paper builds a continuous &lt;strong>optimal-control model of illegal logging&lt;/strong> on general
geographic domains. Loggers choose routes and harvesting behavior in response to resource
value, travel cost, and law-enforcement pressure, while the model accounts for finite-time
logging events and slower travel under heavier loads.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The competing objectives are expressed through Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman and level-set
methods, producing spatial predictions of attractive logging locations and transport
paths. Calibrating the model with observed deforestation in the Brazilian rainforest makes
it possible to compare patrol strategies under realistic terrain and economic conditions.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The numerical results show that enforcement is most effective when it is geographically
targeted rather than distributed uniformly. The framework provides a quantitative way to
study how patrol placement changes the incentives and routes of environmental offenders.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>